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The authors surveyed 41 firms In and around  *  Beneflmt  firms provl'ed  account for large
Moscow In the last two weeks of November  shares of labor income and 40 to 45 percent of
1992 to get an empirical handle on how firms are  firms' costs. Firms may have tried to squeeze
responding to the changing economic environ-  benefits, particularly in housing, but allocations
ment. They found that:  to the Social Fund have generally stayed con-
stant.
- There were large negative (supply and
demand) shocks to output for a significant  *  Employment adjustmaents  were limited,
number of firms and branches.  despite the downward pressure on output and the
lack of growth In firms surveyed. Net employ-
Profitability was remarkably buoyant in real  ment separations were relatively restricted. Firms
terms; there was clear evidence that firms with  continued to hire at significant rates in 1992, In
market power rapidly adjusted producer prices,  part because of fixed factors technology, in part
Lying to maintain or increase their markup.  because of the reluctance of firms to discard
workers. Consequently, firms have shed few
* There was no evidence of a strategic change  workers - mostly ancillary and clerical staff,
in pricing rules.  usually women.
* Most firms experienced relative stability in  *  Some firms chose to place workers on
earnings and In the distribution of revenues.  minimum wages, reducing labor costs signifi-
There was no substantial evidence of  cantly. The result is that unemployment benefits
decapitalization - at least through greater  are provided de facto within the firms rather than
bofrowing or predatory wage settlements.  through labor offices.
* The upward shift in interfirm arrears was  *  In short, the status of the so-called produc-
smaller than aggregate numbers might have led  tion worker, the core of the Russian industrial
one to expect.  firm, remains untouched. Clearly, there was a
large "employment overhang" at the end of
* Inertia in the wage system should not be  1992. The next stage of the transition will be
ignored. Real wages were cut back sharply by  difficult.
the great price shock of January 1992, but real
statistical wages then climbed back toward early
1991 levels.
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Introduction
At the outset of 1992  much was made of the change  in regime that was to be associated  with price
liberalization, reform of property rights and a new-found  intolerance  by the monetary  and fiscal systems
to financial indiscipline. The heart of these changes  had necessarily to be the enterprise sector - the
bedrock of the planned economy. By early 1993, however, aggregate  data indicate  that the regime break
was less evident than might  have expected,  that price liberalization  had transiated  into-persistent  and high
increases  in monthly inflation  aad that structural  changes  remained  restricted. Moreover,  we have shown
elsewhere that despite very significant  negative  shocks  to output over 1992, changes  to employment  and
hence to unemployment  have been less than might have been predicted  2.  Further, the shift in the stance
,f the central  monetary authority  in mid-1992  validated  the accumulation  of large inter-enterprise  arrears
that had been accumulated  through the first half of 1992 and, at the sane  time, sent a qualitatively
different signal to firms regarding the viability of thei: claims - impiicit and explicit - on the budget
and/or banking system.
The response of Russian firms to the price shocks  of 1992 and to the large and, in some cases,
random disturbances  transmitted  through the combination  of trade and political changes  is clearly of key
importance. In particular, we need to know how those shocks  have distributed  themselves  with respect
to branches and the subsequent  actions taken by firms in response to those shocks. This, however, is
easier said than done. One cost of disintegration  has been  considerable  disruption  of the statistical  system
and of the reporting protocols  that characterised  earlier practice. One consequence  has been the ncid to
rely on new data collection  primarily centred on the firm.
This paper provides an extended discussion of firm behaviour with particular emphasie'  on the
associations  between output, financial  performance  and wage and employment  decisions. In addition, we
provide a  first  attempt at  systematically  quantifying the values and  costs of  non-monetary wage
components. The main objective  of the paper is thus to get some empirical  handle on a fluid and diverse
set of changes in the environment  facing firms and structuring  their decision rules.
'1: The Survey
The paper is largely organized  around the results from a small survey of 41 firms that was carried
out in and around Moscow in the last two weeks of November 1992. The firms were randomly selected
and covered ten branches, including  trade and services. Appendix  Tables 1 and 2 give the breakdown
of the sample by size - in terms of employment  and assets, as well as by branch and property type.  As
2 Commnder, LibeMan  ad  YeMtSov  (1993a)Behaviour  of Finms
regards location, iust over 50% of tho sample were situated within Moscow, a further 16 firms in
Moscow  oblast and 3 in other oblasts. All were however in fairly close  proximity  to Moscow. The bulk
of the sample were industrial firms with an average current labour force of over 800.  The legal status
of the sample was reasonably diverse.  If we include state property currently rented by collectives
alongside  collectives  and joint stock entities  we can see that 11 or over 25  % of the sample were, loosely
defined, private firms.
While the sample size is small and localized, the survey results at th.. least provide some cross-
check on the information  given by more aggregate  data. Comparing  the salient 1991 information  for the
industrial firms in our sample with a Goskomstat  survey of over 26,000 Russian industrial enterprises,
we find that our  sample is,  however, strongly biassed toward larger firms.  While we  find fair
correspondence  with respect  to nominal  wages and employment  levels, for sales revenues  and profits, the
World Bank averages  are significantly  different from the Goskomstat  firms.  Revenues  were over 80%
higher for the smallest fims  with less than 200 employees  but were 30% lower for the other two
categories. For gross profits, the World Bank survey reported consistently  higher average levels across
all size classes.  This obviously  suggests  the dangers of over-generalizing  from the sample. Simply  put,
the universe we have surveyed appears likely to be charctrized  by larger firms with higher average
revenues and gross profits.
Nevertheless, the survey allows us to get a richer handle on emerging changes to  important
decision rules with respect to wages, employment  and benefits  that the aggregate  data does not capture.
Finallyi we should note that from aggregate  data it is clear that the Moscow region has been subject to
higher than average employment  contraction  over 1992; the sample  may then reflect  some of the upward
bias in separations that appears characteristic  of the region as a whole.
2: Output Changes
Aggregate data for Russia indicate  that industrial output declined  by around 20% in 1992.  The
distribution of those losses by branch and region is far from uniform but the evidence  broadly  points to
a significant and generalized negative.  shock to output dominated  primarily by an aggregate rather than
a sectoral process.  Nevertheless, there are some signs that sectoral or reallocation  shocks have been
present.  Retating relative producer price changes  to relative output changes we ooserve a reasonably
robust and positive correlation  over 1992.
The heterogeneity  of the firms covered in the survey and difficulties  in secuing accurate estimates
of either value or vol'ume  indicators resulted in the output  questions  being couched in terms of direction
of change and broad physical  magnitude. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate  the picture is fairly mixed acrossBehaviour  of Firns  3
firn  size classes and branch.  For the industrial  firms, the weight is clearlY  cn the negative side with
nearly 60% reporting  declining  output. For firms with falling output  the unweighted  mean projection  for
the year was 20/25% with roughly half the firms reporting over that range. Even so, the picture is not
quite as bleak as one might have initially imagined. 15% of respondents  reported output increases and
the remaining  25% projected  constant  output  over 1992. While  aggregate  data show engineering  and light
industry to  have been hardest hit, the survey shows just under half the engineering  firms reporting
constant  or increasing  output. Moreover  for those firms with output  losses, the decline  was significantly
under the sample mean.
The source of the shocks to output can be variously traced.  In 35% of cases where the output
change  was negative  firms reported the  primary source of the shock  as irregularity  of input supplies. This
source does not seem to be systematically  related  to disruptions in intra-CIS  or ex-CMEA  trade.  Firms
with significant  output  declines were primarily served by local subcontractors.  In the same proportion,
firms reported product demand shocks to be the principal factor  - this dominated, for example, the
.-sponses of engineering  firms.  But in the majority  of cases, firms reported simultaneous  input supply
and product demand shocks. Suspension  of subsidies  was evidently  a lesser factor accounting  for only
13  % of responses. Not surprisingly,  we find both demand  supply  shocks  to be present, even if attribution
of components  remains problematic.
3: Fnacal  Performance
The performance  of Russian  firms over 1992  is difficult  to gauge at all accurately;  in part because
of accounting  procedures. Even so, the obvious impression  given by the path of interenterprise arrears
and the sets of claims on the budget for preferential treatment, suggest that a significant  share of firms
have encountered  financial difficulties  over 1992. Aggregate data show, for example, that while over
55% of Russian  firms experienced  a fall in output  over the first half of 1992, between  60/70% increased
input and output inventories over the same period and roughly comparable shares suffered negative
demand shocks.  The coincidence  of deflation in household  demand for firm output and by dislocation
to inter-firm and inter-CIS transactions could, at first approximation,  be expected to result in adverse
balance sheet developments  for many firms.  However, we also know  of course that the transition from
a suppliers' to a buyers' market - to use Kornai's term - requires more than a relaxation of shortages;
it presumably requires some basic level of competition  in the provision of goods and services.  This
assumption is rather problematic in the Russian context where we observe rlatively  high levels of
concentration and market power.  Indeed, in the survey it is instructive  to note that 60% of firms were-~~~  ~~~~  4  -
Table 1  Physical  Output in 1992:
Direction  of C!.ange  I
Decline  Constr.t  Increase  No reDlv  TOTAL
BY EMPL.  1  _  .
SIZE*  _
1  2  .__  2._  10
2  '  6  1  3  II  11
3  7  3  _3  O - O  10
4  6  _  _I_  _  _
5  2  1_  1  0  3__  _
.... ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~-----  ..- ,-I-i  ---- 1 ------.
|  TOTAL  :3  1  1  6  . 4|
Table 2  Physical  Output in 1992:
Direction  of Change  bv Branch
Decline  Constant  Increase  No reolv  TOTAL
BY BRANCH  _  __  i
Metall.  4  0  0  0  4
Chemic.  1  - 0  O  2
_aci  3  2  _  1  8
Bld-Matr.  3  1  l ___O|
§  Licht  *  |  *  1  _|_r  j
|  Fooc  2  0  0  |  0  |O  2
Agro  2  O  j)  -
Constr.  1  4  0  _  5
Trade  1  1  1  0  3
Science  2  1  1  0  4
,,,,,...  ......  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ...  ...... 1 
TOTAL  23  11  6  1  41
Source:  World  Bank  Survev
"Flr  Sine  Cetegorti:  1-  80-350;  2- 351-700;  3- 101-900;  4m 901-1500;  5-  >150l
employees
SOurce:  Vorld  lank  SurveyFig  1  -5
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either monopolists  or oligopolists,  here deflned  as between  2-S producers. Competitive  conditions  only
dominated in light industry and in other expected  areas  such as trade and services.
Given the large disturbances  to the price level and turbuience  in relative prices, we would expect
considerable  volatility in proflts of firms and a higher measure of randomness  in their distribution over
branches. That, for example, was the evident  outcome in Poland in the first year of price liberalization
over  1990 and we might expect such random effects to be ampli:ied in the presence of differential
constraints  on price setting and the insignificant  trade liberalization  that has occurred in Russia  3.  And
it is indeed the outcome  we appear  to observe over 1992  This result obvIously  cautions  against making
any firm predictions regarding the future path of profits or their distribution.
Figures 1 & 2 point to fair persister^e in both sales and gross profits.  At branch level, we find
that revenues  and gross profits are generally  little shifted  from early 1991  levels, even if there is greater
mtra-quarter variation in 1992.  For firms classified by inirket power, it is striking to observe the
divergent movements  in real revenues and profits for competitive  as against firms with market power.
Competitive  firms suffer an unambiguous  negative  shock  to gross profits and sales over 1992  (see Figure
3).
We find some increase  in the sample variance  over time for monopolists'  gross profits but looking
at variance in branch level gross profits although there are erratic movements we find no evidence of
widespread and increasing variance, as measured by the coefficient of variation.  Even so there is
considerable dispersion in the level of profits at the firm level.  Thus, at first inspection we find no
evidence  of a generalized  sales and profits slump among  the sample. There is one exception  - the largely
budget-financed  'scientific' firms whose  revenues  indeed  turn strongly  negative  in real terms, particularly
in the first half of 1992 when the explicit stance of the government  was to reduce budgetary flows to
firms.  But the bulk of the discussion  below centres on the industrial  and trade firms in the survey.
Ir principle, the net profit position  of firms ought to Provide some indication  of retained profits
and hence of the implicit trade-off  between  current allocations  and the longer  term viability  of the firm.
This is more complicated  in the Russian  context as the allocation  rule governing  the distribution of gross
profits has been qualitatively  different than in a market-based  system.
The net profit position  of firms reflects the distribution  o.  .oss profits over the respective  funds,
profit tax and interest payments. In general, firms are expected  to assign all gross profits but can hold
back  a certain share.  Tables 3 suggests  that in 1992  the dispersion  in net profits was considerably  greater
5See Pinto  et al (1992a)Fig  3
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Table  3
:efficient of variation REAL TOTAL PROFITS BEFORE TAX
)rted by branch
1Q91  2Q91  3Q91  4Q91  1Q92  2Q92  3Q92
1 METALLUR.  0.F4  0.86  0.59  0.53  1.05  1.21  0.35
2 CHEMIC.  0.86  0.69  0.42  0.45  0.96  0.83  0.79
3 MACHNBLD.  0.70  0.75  0.90  0.76  1.26  1.67  1.80
4 BUILD.MTR  0.92  0.77  0.68  0.60  0.66  0.49  0.74
5 LIGHT  IN.  1.03  0.86  1.12  1.09  1.11  1.13  1.41
6 FOO'V  TND  0.87  0.61  0.84  0.76  0.80  0.89  0.92
7 A..  z)IND.  0.49  0.90  0.96  0.83  0.91  1.00  0.95
8 CONSTR.  1.20  0.78  0.56  0.44  0.67  0.86  1.09
9 TRADE&SER  0.63  0.76  0.79  0.80  0.64  0.81  1.13
0 SCIENCE  0.42  0.24  0.35  0.60  0.29  0.71  0.98
oefficient of variation NET PROFITS
orted by branch:
1Q91  2Q91  3Q91  4Q91  lQ92  2Q92  3Q92
1 METALLUR.  1.08  2.13  4.83  -0.91  0.89  3.31  2.40
2 CHEMIC.  -1.00  -'.00  -1.00  -1.23  1.00  -0.68  1.06
3  MACHNBLD.  -20.64 -37.08  2.46  -1.75  2.88  2.28  2.25
4 BUILD.MTR  -4.02  -2.40  -2.27  0.92  3.27  -1.73  1.47
5  LIGHT  IN.  11.86  3.66  4.35  0.78  1.26  2.55  1.61
6  FOOD  IND  1.24  1.61  1.28  -0.94  -0.84  -0.89  -0.96
7 AGROIND.  0.86  1.02  -0.74  0.95  0.91  1.01  1.00
8 CONSTR.  -1.44  -3.03  -9.24  -2.07  -1.28  -2.31  -1.40
9 TRADE&SER  3.31  2.36  2.66  1.59  1.71  2.11  -8.85
10 SCIENCE  -2.67  -4.13 -15.71  -7.02  -1.47  -1.48  -4.27- 1
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than for gross profits.  Indeed, over a quarter of the sample registered  negative  net profits in at least two
of the three reported quarters  of 1992. However,  almost all these  finrs reported negative  profits through
1991 which obviously  weakens the argument that negative  profit shocks were loaded into 1992.
Further, given uncertainty  over rules regarding  investment  allocations,  profit tax rates and self-financing
requirements  as well as strongly negative  real interest rates, it is not surprising to find finms assigning
more than current gross profits.  This can reflect a drawing down  of financial  reserves or commitments
which firms seek to cover ultimately  through financing  by the banking  system.
We can also note the general stability  of the shares accounted  for by the respective funds in the
allocation  of gross profits (Figure 4).  In particular, it is striking  to note the resilience  of investment  and
technical development  fund allocations.  While we cannot satisfactorily  capture the end-use of fund
expenditures,  we do not observe any notable  shifting  off resources towards  bonus  payments or the social
fund, where the translation  into current wages would be easier.
3.1: Market Power
Market power can obviously  trace itself into both output and price decisions. High concentration
in Russian industry  and the maintenance  of cost-plus  pricing rules are occasionally  cited as explaining  the
inflation in producer prices over 1992. Figure 5 plots the change in aggregate  producer prices relative
to retail prices.  The sharper acceleradon in the former is very evident.  How can this be explained ?
First, we should note that the sample  generating  the data plotted in Figure 5 is both small and restricted
to larger firms in each of the sampled  branches. We are therefore  observing the behaviour of producer
prices for large firms in the Russian  economy;  a possible indication  of the pricing rule pursued by large
enterprises.
As  revealing, perhaps, is the light that the survey sheds on the implicit differential pricing
behaviour of firms when classified  in terms of market power.  For 32 firms where we have information
on both changes in output volume  and changes  in real profits we are able to break this down in terms of
market attributes, classifying  in terms of monopolists,  few producers  and competitive  firms 4.  The most
striking result is that in nearly half the cases where firms were either monopolists  or one among few
producers, negative shocks to output in 1992 were systematically  and inversely associated  with positive
changes to profits over the same reference period.  The relation holds most strongly for firms in the
machine-building  and metallurgy  branches. By contrast, competidve  firms - particularly  in light industry
- display a more conventional  positive co-movement  in output and profits.  For almost aU competitive
4We  exclude  the adminisrve  atites,  suchas those  clamified  in 'Science'  from the  sub-sanle.1.g  4  - 11  -
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fitma,  we  observe  ne  changes  m output  associated  with  negative  changes  to profits. The obvious
conclusion  to be drawn  is that firms  with market  power  have  adjusted  outpUt  prces with  the imtention  of
m  aining  or  esing deir mark-up.  Figures  6 & 7 provide  scatters  relaig  output  and grcs  profit
changes.  For firms with market power it is clear that negtve  stockm  to oupt  have mostly  been
associated  with  positive  changes  m gross  profits. This does  not hold for competitve  firms.
The firm level imation  dts  seems  consistent  with  the path  of the more aggregaed  producer
price series available  for branches  at a Russian  level.  The implication  is that we are coemiing to
obsrve the behaviour  of de fato price setten able  to control  direcdy  gross  value added.
3.2:  _ntupuise  Arrears
A well  noted  fetre  of 1992  and it now  appears,  also of early 1993  has bern the  a  lio
of arge  inter-fin arrears. The process  was  motivated  by a combination  of factors,  including  institutiona
facts  - swuh  as the nenalt  of payables  and recevables  with t  cmrest to  r  borrowing  from  the
banking  sysm  - but is gen  truaced  to the initial  naive  shods to bale  shees aising frm
seective leralination 3. We can also  add that  the attibton  of aras  financin has had clear  politd
ecowxny  implicaos,  beiqg  in deffct  a clear  challenge  to the credibility  of the  govmet's  anonced
monetry and fiscal  sace.
e smvey  results  are  _  id  in Fiue  8. This  gives  the path  of net  payables  over 1991  and
1992  brokS down  by size of fim  It is clear  that  fims have  generally  shifted  their  net  payables  position
upwarsin  real  tms  over 1992  even  alongside  rlavely  buoam profits'  profiles. This  has pauly come
a  Ollt  dlroug1h  uieasg  ous  mg  paymnmts  to sppliers; a ftature that seems fuaher to be positvdy
assoated  with  the maret power  parmet.  The raio of net  payables  to sales rises  quite significaty
for monopolists,  rainin  bradly stable  for other  entties. But  it is  patculaly  stikng that in general,
dte increase  in n  payables  is largdy  1edent  of the path  of profits  at the firm level. There is no
remotly robust  invse  association,  for example,  between  profits  and net payables;  an association  that
one mig  presume  to hold  if arrears  are  a reaonbly  sti  fiction  of caT  profitabty.  Tbis  points
to a common  process  and  one where  it has been  perceived  that  the gams  from  fored bonowing  are non-
trivial, eiter  via interest  rate eifcts  (ie the negtive real interest  ates)  or via probabilites  of having
outslg  obligaidons  covered  by the Central  Ban
Obsmring  the path  of interest  costs over 1991/92,  Fie  9 prvides informadon  on the  aio of
tota interest  to sales for firms classed  by asset sir.  There is little  evidence  of any icas  in inte
sSee Cmumde  et al (1993a)  for more  dismsimo  on the  ies.'li; '.  I!  ~,  . -. 
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Fig  8
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charges pointing to a strategy of financial distress borrowing or reliance by firns  on borrowing to
maintain current output in the face of falling capacity utilization  and sales.  Taking the same ratio over
the branches, we do observe a sharp increase in trade financing  costs but the general conclusion  holds.
3.3: Decapitalization
The issue of decapitalization  of firms is obviously relevant  given the loose control structure that
now obtains, the uncertainty  over future viability  and the presence of very significant  insider bargaining
power.  Decapitalization  is hard to capture satisfactorily  but at first approximation  can be thought to
proceed by three possible channels.  First, by running down current capital stock through little or no
maintenance;  second, by letting depreciation  exceed current investments  and third, by excessive  current
wage claims that likely imperil the future financial  well-being of the firm.  The first is impossible  to
measure but some summary ratios are quite instructive  in getting a handle on the other two possible
channels 6.
On wages and benefits  costs, we find considerable  stability  in the share relative to revenues. The
ratio of wage tax payments  to revenues  also provides a simple  proxy.  But the data indicate  no upward
d-rift  across branches, save in the budget sector where the scale of deterioration in revenues  swamps  the
adjustnent to wages. We also find no evidence  in the evolution  of the wage tax of predatory wage setting
and short run behaviour.
Data  on  the  investment-depreciation  ratio provide no  general evidence of  a  slowdown in
investments. At branch level there are signs  that by 1992.3  the upward  shift in the ratio over early 1992
was being reversed and moving back towards 1991  ratios.  Further, we do see a sharper decline for the
budget sector entities - the scientific firms - that we know to have been in financial  difficulties over
1992. However, where we observe a fall in the investment  /depreciation  ratio little of this can be traced
to excess wage tax payments.  The finding is hardly surprising given the weak bite of the wage tax,
which we discuss further below.
4: Employment Changes
The employment  picture is most notable for the relatively  slow adjustment  of employment  given
the size of changes to output alongside  a substantial  volume of labour turnover and churning.
Table 4 provides some information  on the structure of employment  in the firms that were sampled.
Several features stand out.  In the first instance, the classical feature of the Soviet-type firm - the
dominance of production workers - stands out.  Across the full sample, nearly 70% of the workforce
6 As also  done in the  case  of Polish  state  firms  by Pinto,  Belka  and Krajewski  (1992a).I  - 16  -
Table  4:(ITployaent  Profile,  1992
Shares  --  Firm Size  Class----------
Fir  Slze  1  2  3  4  S
Administr  26.2  23.8  16.9  40.7  12.9
ITR  21.8  22.4  20.1  33.5  12.1
Clercs  4.3  2.8  2.1  6.8  0.8
F?T  Workr  68.9  72.0  71.0  56.3  77.5
Prod.Work  56.9  63.0  68.4  50.2  77.5
Unskill  14.3  15.8  5.8  6.1  0.4
Apprents  0.9  0.2  0.6  0.2  2.8
Paret-tim  4.1  2.2  3.2  3.0  1.7
RetraLn  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.8  0.0
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Kale  F-T  61.2  52.8  51.1  48.2  36.7
Fem.  F.T  31.7  45.0  45.3  46.3  63.6
Kale  P-T  3.5  1.2  2.0  1.9  0.8
fem.  P1T  0.6  0.6  0.8  1.1  0.0
Table  5:  Employment  Chnges  over  1992,  3rd  Quarter
Separation,  HirLu$  and  Vacancy  Rates  (% of  labour  force)
Firm  Size
1  2  3  4  S
Separations  10.5  10.0  9.5  5.7  7.8
HLres  7.2  3.7  4.8  2.5  9.9
Net  Separations  3.7  7.0  5.2  3.3  -2.2
Expacted  Separ-
ations  in  92.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  0.5  0.5
VacancLes  1.5  3.1  1.0  2.2  1.9
Posted  Vacancy  0.1  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.1
Source:  World  Bank Survey
Table  6:  Job  Separations  by Type
(% of  total  separations)
Flzz  Size
1  2  3  4  5
Quits  62.2  52.3  52.9  43.4  52.7
DisciplinAry  8.5  3.2  3.4  7.7  4.7
Employment
Reduction  10.4  31.3  10.7  37.1  3.1
Other  19.9  13.2  33.0  11.8  39.5
Source:  World  bank  SurveyBehaviour  of Firms  -17-
was of  this  category. Moreover, the share of unskilled labour remains fairly low -ad  primarily
characteristic  of the smaller firms. Second, we note the high proportion  of female  workers in the labour
force.  Third, part time work remains a fairly limited phenomenon  across all firn  size classes.
At an aggregate  level, the main conclusions  that emerge from Russian  data regarding the path of
employment  in 1992  can be summarized  as follows. Employment  losses  have been relatively  small across
the state sector  as whole  and for industry  in particular. Indeed,  over 1992  industrial  employment  declined
by under 1% relative to 1991 levels. The losses  in the state sector as a whole - under 2% - have been
larger and more regionally  concentrated. Preliminary  information  suggests  that a sizable share of job
losses in the state sector, primarily in the non-material  sector - have been concentrated in the Central
region and most particularly  in the area around Moscow. Therefore, a starting  assumption  would be that
our survey might inipart a upward bias to estimates  of job losses, given  the overall characteristics  of the
region.
This is not fully  supported  by the firm evidence. There has been  an undoubted  acceleration  in the
rate of job destruction but the process has not been as one-sided  as one might intuite from a casual
understanding  of the size of the shocks to output.  Reallocation  shocks resulting from the change in
relative prices would hypothetically  result in differential  paths of job destruction  and creation.  But we
observe little that accords with this view.  Rather, we continue  to observe the coincidence  of relatively
high rates of job destruction  and creation  that do not apparently  match to relative  price shifts. Of course,
one may be failing to capture  intra-branch  shifts  but the dominant  impression  is of persistence  in job hires
with low net inflows to unemployment  as a consequence. Indeed, aggregate  unemployment  fell below
2% of the labour force at the end of 1992 in both the Moscow  region and in Russia as a whole.
Figure 10 provides the basic infomiation at the Russian level on inflows to and outflows from
unemployment. Of course, on the inflows side it includes  new entrants  but the fact of relatively constant
monthly inflow numbers alongside  a significant  flows  out of unemployment,  including  to jobs, provides
a  first  approximation at the underlying process we appear to  be observing.  That process seems
characterized by a high degree of churning in the labour market that does not simply accord with the
prognosis that only  job destruction  should  be occurring. While  job destruction  obviously  dominates new
starts, net destruction rates are fairly low.  This gives some insight  into the trpe of churning  we should
expect to see.
The response of firms to a perceived  permanent  negative  shock might be expected  to show up in
reductions in labour capacity, through short time and involuntary  holidays or an increase in part time
working. It would also be expected  to show up in increased  net separations. With regard to the first, we- 18 -
Fig  10
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find little evidence  of an increase in part time work being the preferred route.  Nor do we find evidence
that short time working and involuntary  holidays  have been that widely  used.  By 1992.3  under 35% of
finns in the sample reported use of short time work and 17% use of involuntary  leaves.  Under 5% of
the total sample labour force was on involuntary  leave and nearly 90% were concentrated in machine
building and light industry. This estimate  appears on the low side comparing  with information  available
from more aggregate data.  A far larger Goskomstat  suivey in August 1992 covering over 1500 finns
across all regions reported nealy a third of employees  on rnvoluntary  leave or short time 7.
For explicit separations,  the survey data indicate  that while nearly three-quarters  of the sample
reported net employment  losses for the third quarter of 1992, over 25% posted net employment  gains.
At the same time, in one quarter alone nearly 3% of the labour force experienced  some labour market
transidon. Table 5 contains  some interesting  information. In the first place, total separations  amounted
to between 8-10% across the firm size classes  and the separation  rate was rather evenly distributed. Nfet
job losses  were much smalller  amounting  to no more than  5% over the whole  sample. This is higher than
the national level but reasonably consistent  with what we know about the path of employment  in the
Moscow region.  For net job losers, the dispersion is fairly low but in general biassed upwards for
smaller firms. Indeed, the largest  finns experienced  net increases  to their labour force over the reference
period.  Expected  job losses over the fourth quarter of 1992  were similarly reported at low frequencies
and were inversely associated  with firm size.
Table 6 also pins down  the principal  characestics  of the separations  process.  The dominance  of
quits is striking and over 50% of all separations  can be classed as voluntary.  Explicit  job reduction
decisions display considerable  varance  and amounted to around 17% of gross job losses for the full
sample. Total involuntary  separations  comprised  less than a quarter of reported total separations. The
weight of  quits  in  total separations reinforces the view that the Russian labour market remais
characterized  by rather high turnover  at local lev"ia,  if not across regions where institutional,  housing  and
other constraints  tend to be more binding.
The persistnce  in hires raises some interesting  questions. Relating  output  changes  to employment
changes in the sample is instructive. Perhaps most striking is the absence of a clear and predictable
relationship between output and employment movements.  Indeed, for the 25% of the sample that
reported positive net hires in 1992.3, nearly 70% projected  output losses  over 1992  with an unweighted
mean decline of 15%  There is significant  dispersion  over branches  and firm size classes with respect
7 For Moscow  the figure  was  25% for a sample  of 23 firms.dhviour  of  Fun  ..  - 20 -
to enoyment  chages but tdere if Oer  aynfzty  with rgd  to the si  of shock  to oupu.  For the
outmos  obsevato  when outtt  losses  ranged  betwen 35-50%,  employmnt  contraction  avead
no more tha  15%.
Tabe 7 ad  Figures  11-14  pat togedher  the diection of output,  gro  profit and employnt
chqns  for the survey  fire.  It is clar that  the  gap  btween ouW  ad  emuployment  chan  was quite
large.  The scauers aga  classifv  m tums  of mrku  power and ae  mainly remadrable  fo; showing  no
pdiable  relationip  beten  ouptp or profits  and eloyment  cbges  for  ither  types  of fim.
The clear  cowcusion  thu can be drwn. bearig in mind  the limitatons  of the ow quare  recall
period , is that employment  adjus_new have  been suggh,  uneven  ad  resticd  gien  the sine of
c_ages to ouqau  At fist approxination,  we may  assume  that  labour  prodctivity has decined.
Ibe survey  rults  renforce the concsion gathered  from  more  aggreate data  sours  regarding
the caoning  high aties  of  ovaer, very low  lvels of involhny  separtions, significant  hiin  and
a gen_aly low levd of net  job loes  in Russia  though 1992. Hove,  sevra  fctors repqay  more
atenin  Fst,  the high level of quits ad  hir  for workas - i  both cases dte prq  nom we
Inict  above  the shre of worrm in the fin'  labour  force. Second,  thee is the d_mn  of
prodtonworkers,  rather  n unskl  workers,  in thse  quits. It se  likely  at this process  has
been prmotd  by emgig  competitio  for workers  and  by the pesite  of sperp  shorages for
skldled  or producom  worken. Th recet liberalizion of the wage  settig and wag stuctu  - while
qu  videnly highly ncomple (see  Seai  5) - pes  liely to have  promotd local  job tuwver
as production  woes  chase  relative  wage  adju  us.  Tis  obviously  begs  the  quesin  of why  labor
demnd for such  workers  remains  so rlatvely  buoyan  Te  nswer  seems aily  to found  in fixed
fators or techology.  What  we  know  about  work  orgaimut  i  Soviet  industrial  plants  aso enma
the strong  and somewhat  mechanical  asociaton of plant  to labour.
Involuntary  labour  sheddig ha consequently  been  concenrtd  on nowprodction  workers  and,
in parcular,  women. We know  frm  the unemployment  daa that  women  comprse over 705 of the
unemployed  in the seond half of 1992. We  also bnow  that  tbis share  has not  been  vasdy  shiftd by dte
growing  weight  of layoffs  in total inflows  to unemployment.  While inflows  to unew oy  t  hve
Iap  y dominated  by releases  frm  the admisative  sector, it also seems  to be the case that
pducte  sector  fim  have  shed  a  ive,  unskilled  and  fe  bour  first. The  clear  impict
is that producion workers  have  remained  largely  untouched  by unemloyment  and by the process  of
'These lim  ons  inlude possble  seasonal  disturn  and  out-of-period  dnges.Table 7  :  Output  and Employment  Chaniges  in 1992  by Branch
output  Employment
Branch  Decrease----------  -----  Decrease
Increase  Constant  1  2  3  Growth  Constant  1  2  3
Metallurgy  3  1  1  1  2
Chemicals  1  1  1  1
Machine Building  2  2  4  2  5  1
Buildinig  Materials  1  2  1  2  1
Light  1  2  3  1  1  4  1  1
Food  I  1  I  I
Agrotndustry  2  1  1
Construction  4  1  3  1  1
Trade  & Services  I  1  1  1  2
Science  1  I  1  2  1
Decrease  1=  0.1-9.9%;  2= 10-19.9Z;  3=  202  +
Source:  World  Bank  Survey
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involuntary separation.  Firms have, wherever possible, dispensed with ancillary workers, largely
concentrated  in administrative  work and in many  cases female  labour. However,  even here the job losses
in industrial enterprises remained very limited by the end of 1992. The bulk of job losses have been
concentrated  in the state budget  or non-material  sector not in industry. This also explains  the high weight
of female in total unemployment.
4.1: Labour Hoarding
The relatively ge:tle decline in employment  relative to output in industry is striking particularly
given the widespread  acknowledgement  of extensive  and continuing  labour hoarding. Nearly two-thirds
of sampled  firms reported excess employment  levels in 1992.3. This was fairly equally  distributed across
firm size class and branch and, with the exception  of the largest  firms where the estimate  was below 1%,
was put at between 8-14% of current employment.
At first glance, one might expect institutional  factors governing  dismissals  and/or union presence
to impede involuntary sepa&ations  9.  But this appears generally  not to be true.  Unions are present in
most workforces but carry negligible bargaining power so that in only 10% of cases where excess
employment  was present were dismissal  rules and worker protest cited as factors of any significance  in
governing employment  decisions. By contrast, in nearly two-thirds  of those cases the motive for labour
hoarding  was the belief that output  would  shortly expand,  warranting  current retention  of excess workers.
In 25% of cases, the argument given  was that such workers  were not a significant  financial  burden to the
film.
The latter response  can also be related to the prevalence  of minimum  wage workers  within firms.
Average industrial wages exceeded minimum wages by a  factor of between 5-12 times over  1992.
Evidence from the survey suggests  that some firms - particularly in engineering  and light branches -
have begun to place parts of their labour force on or around minimum wages with minimal work
requirenents.  Minimum wages were reported for nearly 4.5% of the sample workforce °.  In one
instance, the aerodynamics  design firm - TsAGI - we found that around a quarter of the workforce of
c. 10,000 - primarily the unskilled  - had been placed on minimum  wages.  This amounts to de facto
provision of unemployment  benefit within  the firm, with, of course, the difference  that workers still have
access to some firm-provided  benefits. Assuming  the rough distribution of wages in total labour costs
9 Firing  decisions  were taken  by the administration  alone  in 60%  of cases,  by the administration  in association
with the trade  union  in 159 of cases  and  by the factory  council  in the remaining  15%. Opposition  to dismissals
arose from  the trade  unions  in half  the sample,  but significantly  no opposition  was reported  in a third of cases.
'° 13%  for engineering  firms;  9% for light  industry.Behaviour  of Firms  - 25  -
from the finm-side  (as indicated  below in Section  6) and constant  access to non-wage benefits, resort to
minimum wages would have allowed  firms to make per capita cost savings of at least 45% over 1992.
At the margin, a reduction in the nominal wage would likely have had a more powerful effect than the
cut in benefits costs associated  with a marginal  employment  change.
Finally, in time with aggregate  data we observe low vacancy levels with posted labour demand -
a better indicator than notional vacancies  - amounting  to under I % of the current sample workforce.
This again is consistent with the idea that hiring behaviour is largely conditioned  by replacement  of
turnovers and by an apparent rigidity with respect to employment  levels in industrial firms.  Labour
hoarding  appears  motivated  by a combination  of factors, including  teclmology  and an apparent willingness
to provide fall-back  wages  - the minimum  wage - within  the firm.
S: Wage Settng
The appropriate  treatnent of wages is problematic  given  significant  variance in levels of shortage
in goods markets over time and region.  Further, there is wide dispersion  in price levels across region
alongside  significant  variation  in regional inflation  rates, as well as in the changes  to nominal wages, over
1992. Figures 15 & 16 provides information  on wage levels over the period February to October 1992
for all-Russia as for Moscow and Moscow oblast.  There is a notable gap between the latter two areas;
a gap that widens over the course of 1992, largely  via divergences  in local inflation  rates than by changes
to nominal wages.
Despite these significant  variations, a summary  of recent wage developments  need highlight the
climb in statistical real wages over the second half of 1991, followed  by a substantial  cut induced  by the
price shock of January 1992.  That shock took average industrial wages back to  mid-1991 levels.
Following  January 1992  we observe a consistent  increase  in real wages over the course of the rest of the
year.  By October 1992, real wages were notionally  13% higher than in July 1991  and over 85% higher
than in January 1992. The regional coefficient  of variation  was around 25%.
The acceleration  in nominal claims has to be tempered  by the knowledge  that cash shortages and
other constraints  in the first half of 1992  drove a wedge  between  notional  and actual  claims, one symptom
of which was the accumulation of substantial wage arrears by finns.  Nevertheless, the dominant
impression  is of an initiad  shock to cash wages  subsequently  cancelled  out by increasing  claims and weak
constraints exerciaed  tirough the current excess wage tax rule "'.
" A wage  bill exceeding  the minimum  wage  times  four times  the number  of employees  was added  to profits
and taxed  at 32%.- 26  -
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The survey results are broadly  consistent  with the story told by aggregate  data.  In the first place,
comparing the third quarters  of 1991  and 1992 we find that real statistical  wages (see Tables 8 & 9) fell
on average by around 30%; a fall consistent  with real wages broadly equating early 1991 levels by the
third quarter of 1992. Figure 17 presents information  on the evolution  of the real wage bill across firm
size classes using the retail price deflator. It can be seen that for the full sample the aggregate  real wage
Jeclined slightly over the period 1991.1/3  - 1992.1/3. There is a clear dip in the first quarter of 1992
followed by a  robust, across-the-board  recovery.  By the third quarter of  1992 wages had largely
recovered the levels of early 1991. There is some evidence  of growing variance within three of the ten
branches, but in general we observe little movement  in the coefficient  of variation.
The wage path is striking  for demonstrating  the apparent rigidity of real statistical wages.  Over
the. same period, we know that for the sample there were employment losses, even if not of high
rvagnitudes. The clear result is that average per capita wages increased unambiguously  over the same
reference  period.
Relating  wage changes to the measure  of market power is again quite interesting. The stability  or
growth of real statistical  wages  of the period for monopolists  or those with few competitors  contrasts  with
the non-trivial  decline  in wages  that can be seen for competitive  firms.  Further, relating  output  and wage
changes by categories  of firm, we can see from the scatters (Figures 18-19)  that for firms with market
power, output  and real wage changes  are largely inversely  related. However, as we also know  that output
and gross profit changes were inversely  related for many of these firms, the association  between  profits
and wage changes  is more conventional. By contrast,  the majority  of competitive  firms demonstrate  clear
co-movement  of output  and wages. Again, the reference  periods are the first three quartes of 1992  over
the same quarters of 1991.
51:  Reative Wags
The path of relative wages is revealing. Table 8 drives home the perverse wage structure of the
Russian  firm and the strong bias toward skiled  workers  in the earnings  profile. But they also bring home
the point that relative wages had by 1992.3  shifted  surprisingly  little.  Over the period 1991.3 - 1992.3
we find rather close convergence in the rates of increase across the main grade categories.  The only
relative loser was professional  or ITR staff, such as engineers, but the shift in relativities  was not that
large.  It  is also evident that wage changes at the top of the grade structure - for highest level
management  - have been consistently  higher and that this has been true particularly among the larger
firms.- 28  -
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The data presented  above  suggests  that the compression  in the returns to skills given by the
previous  tariff wage  system  has only  just begun  to come  apart and the process  as yet remains  rather
muted. Indeed,  while  40% of sampled  firms  reported  an increase  in wage  differentials,  the remaining
60% reported  either  no change  or a decline  in differentials.  Where  differentials  increased,  the primary
reason  given  was developments  in the  labour  market  rather  than  any  explicit  association  to private  sector
wages  or prices. Indeed,  in 75% of cases  private  sector  wages  were  viewed  to be consistently  higher
across  all comparable  grades and skills.  The shift in relativities  is likely  to be part of the process
geneating  the substantial  churning  among  skilled  workers  that  we have  already  referred  to in Section  4.
5.2:  Bargaining  and  Wage Targets
The survey  also  allows  us to get some  idea  of the process  by which  wage  claims  are generated  and
subsequently  validated. Several  features  - largely  of an inertial  quality  - can be isolated. First, few
firms  resort  to any  systematic  bargaining  with  labour  over wages. When  explicitly  asked  whether  wages
were set by management  or resulted  from an explicit  bargain  between  the administration  and workers,
only 7 (17%)  firms  reported  the latter  procedure. Of interest  is the somewhat  higher  predominance  of
bargaining  among  cooperative,  private  and collective  firms  - over a quarter  of these  firms had active
bargaining.
This is not to say that current  members  do not have very significant  influence  over the wage
setting. The path of nominal  claims  and the stability  of employment  is reasonable  enough  evidence  of
tdat fact.  But it may be more appropriate  to couch  the problem  in terms  of a cooperative  association
between  management  and workers  with current  membership  claims  on employment  and wages  given
preference.  However, this can also explain, through the continuing  dominance  of  general or
administratively  set  wages,  the relatively  restrained  rearrangement  of relative  wages  that  appears  to have
occurred  and which  we have  noted  sbove.
Clear  evidence  of the increasing  association  of wage  changes  to consumer  prices  also emerges  -
over 60% of firms sought  to link wages  to prices  explicitly  and  the remainder  complemented  this with
increased  provision  of social  benefils. However,  while  the benchmark  for wage  changes  was indeed
consumer  prices  for over  a quarter  of firms,  we can  observe  the presence  of constaints  on this linkage.
Nearly  70%  of the sample  noted  that  the wage  benchmark  was  largely  overdetermined  by current  ithin-
firm resources. This is confirmed  by the responses  to an explicit  question  on constraints  to wage
increases  over 1991  and 1992. For the former,  we find that  taxation  and current  revenues  have  equal
weight  (both  yielding  40% of responses)  in determining  the wage  path. Explicit  outside  regulation  only
was a factor in 7 firms,  declining  to 4 in 1992. Most  significantly,  taxation  constraints  were cited byBehaviour of Firms  - 30
only a quarter of firms as a strong constraint in 1992, with over 60% citing current revenues as the
primary factor. This is consistent,  of course, with wllat we know about  the excess wage tax rule and its
general ineffectiveness  over 1992.  And as expected, we find that real wage tax payments by firms
decline slightly across most size classes for the period 1992.Q1-3  over 1991.Ql-3.
6: Fnrm-Provided Benefits
It has long been realized that benefits provided  through the firm were an important  component of
labour income. Nevertheless,  it has been far from clear what the value of such benefits  were, particularly
given the large non-monetary  component.  The matter acquires yet more significance in the light of
demands  for local authorities  and other institutions  to take over the benefits programmes  hitherto run by
firms. This section  provides both an overview  of the type of benefits  provided  by firms and then attaches
costs and/or income flows  to those benefits. In this way, we hope to provide some measure of the share
of benefits costs in total labour charges from the cost perspective  of the firm while also picking up the
effective distribution of labour income.  In addition, we provide a more extended discussion of one
crucial component of benefits - the housing programmes  run by a significant  minority of firms in the
survey.
But first a simple listing of the types of benefits provided by firms is given in Table 10.  It can
be seen that a significant  proportion  o, the total labour  force continues  to have entitlements  to child care,
paid vacations, housing and holiday  homes. We can make a distinction  over mandatory benefits  - such
as maternity or child care allowances - and discretionary  benefits.  It is clear that the latter are both
varied and pervasive across all firm size classes.  Further, there is a positive association between firm
size, as measured by employment,  and range of benefits. The absence  of housing programmes among
several of the largest firms may be unrepresentative. Bigger samples  - such as the ILO survey of 500
firms - point to housing programmes as an almost defining feature of larger firms 12.  This is more
likely to be true for firms that act as locally  dominant employers. Here, the functions  of local authorities
appear to be commonly  arrogated.
Among smaller firms with less local labour market dominance,  the evidence suggests that firm
provided benefits may not necessarily exceed those covered by local authorities. Indeed, in our sample
for housing, child care and health facilities, firm expenditure  at local level was comparable  or in excess
of local authority or non-firm expenditures in only 10-30%  of cases, depending  on the function (see
12  See Standing  (1992a)- 31  -
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Table  8:  Wage Levels,  1991.3Q  - 1992.3Q: Moscow  Region
By Firm  Size  and  Type  of Employee:  Monthly  Wages  (roubles)  1991  and  1992  Third
Quarters
Firm Size (employment)
1  2  3  4  5
91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3
Vice-
Director  826  8192  1175  10583  1209  13581  1186  13766  1058  16896
ITR  803  6773  904  5559  791  7952  796  8001  546  6533
Professional
Skilled  903  8070  808  6927  877  9410  738  8566  681  9151
Workers
Unskilled  539  5897  524  4600  400  3591  275  3354  299  4207
Workers
Firm Size  Categories:  1- 80-350;  2- 351-700;  3- 701-900;  4- 901-1500;  5-  >1501
employees
Source: World  Bank Survey
Table  9:  Real  Statistical  Wage  Index;  by  Firm  Size  and  Type  of  Work;  (1991.3-100)
Firm  Size
1-  2  3  4  5
Vice-
Director  64  58  72  75  103
ITR  54  40  65  65  77
Professional
Skilled  58  55  69  75  87
Workers
Unskilled  70  57  58  79  91
Workers
Source:  World  Bank  Survey- 33  -
Table  10:  Benefits  --  Type  and  Availability  by Firm  Size,  November  1992
---  Firm  Size ---
1  2  3  4  5
SAMPLE  SIZE  10  11  10  7  3
Housing  (permanent)  2  5  8  5  0
Housing  (temp)  1  3  4  3  0
Kindergarten  1  5  8  6  2
Land  for  dachas  3  7  7  6  3
Canteen  (subsid)  4  6  8  7  2
Polyclinics  access  2  2  5  5  2
Community  House  0  1  3  3  0
Fitness  facilities  0  0  1  2  0
Sanatorium  0  6  4  4  1
Food Store  with  8  9  7  6  2
subsidiz.  prices
Sick  Pay  0  0  3  2  1
Housing  rents  0  0  0  1  0
assistance
Other  forms  of  0  6  4  4  0
housing  help
Transport  allowance  3  3  1  3  2
Maternity  allowance  10  11  10  7  2
Child  Care allowance  10  11  9  7  3
Paid  Vacation  4  8  7  3  0
Pre-dismissal  allow.  8  10  8  4  3
Sanatorium  vouchers  8  10  9  6  3
Source:  World  Bank surveyBehaviour  of Firms  3
Appendix Table 3).  As these items constitute  the major expenditure  charges on the benefits side, this
cautions against a simplistic  view of the scale of firm-level  functions.
6.1: Costs of Benefits
Considerable  uncertainty  currently exists with regard to the respective  shares of benefits costs in
firms' labour  payments. The survey allows  us to get a reasonably  detailed  picture on this score.  Several
points stand out.  First, wages as reflected  in the firms' wage bills (inclusive of the wage tax) account
for roughly 50%  of total labour costs. Including  bonuses  raises this share to just over 60% for the entire
sample.  The remaining costs are distributed  over Pensions, Social Insurance  taxes, Employment  Fund
payments and, most significantly,  Social  Fund  allocations. The latter  amount  to over 20% of total labour-
related costs and around 40% of benefits  charges  (ie; excluding  the wage bill). This information  is given
in terms of firm size for 1991.1 - 1992.3 (Figures 20 - 22).  While we observe considerable  variance
over firm size classes, as well as for branches, for the respective shares, we do in general find a
surprising degrte tf stability. This is also true for the levels. There is some evidence  that social fund
shares have been boosted over 1992, poss Mly  as a mechanism  for raising de facto wage payments  while
circumventing  the excess wage tax, but the trend is by no means universal across or within firm size
classes.  Overall, the inertia in shares is the more striking feature.
Comparing the first three quarters of 1991 with 1992 real aggregate labour costs fell slightly.
Small declines were registered in 70% of branches with, significant  increases in the remaining 30%.
Figure 23 shows  ie path of aggregate  labour-related  costs for the period 1991.1 - 1992.3.  The main
story is the fair constancy  of labour-related  costs when ironing  out the climb in statistical  claims over the
second half of 1991.  As such, we find considerable  corroborative  support for the conclusions  derived
from more aggregated wage data.  Further, we can pin down reasonable  stability in the cost structure
allowing us to conclude that, at least for our sample, benefits do not appear to have been a widespread
mechanism  either for significandy  raising  or lowering  aggregate  labour  costs. The path of both the levels
and the shares indicates  that including  benefits costs in total labour costs has no marked effect on the
distribution.  This holds whether classifying  over branch or firm size, as measured by employment  or
value of fixed assets.
Taken from the income side, we likewise find considerable stability in the shares - wages
accounting for roughly 50% of total labour income, rising to around 65% when factoring in bonus
payments - and for the levels. In summary, it seems that benefits, dissociated  from more conventional
cash wage or effort-related incentives,  comprise  at current prices approximately  35  % of labour income.
The dispersion is dampened  by the dominant,  across-the-board  weight  (0.6) of Social Fund expenditum- 35  -
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in total benefits. Clearly, a more satisfactory  measure might be achieved  by attributing shadow  prices.
Given the volatility  of prices and the uncertainty  with respect to the levels  at which key prices are likely
to settle, we do not attempt this task.
6.2: Housing
Housing  programmes  provide the single largest component  of benefits programmes. Though by
no means universally  provided, we found that a signficant minority  of firms - over 50% of the sample -
- had some form of direct housing  programme. There seems to be a clear positive association  with firm
size but, save among the smallest firms, housing  programmes  were offered by a majority  of enterprises.
In all, over 28% of the total labour force was housed in firm property  and this share rose to over 75%
in the case of the second largest firm size class (see Table 11).
While housing has normally been financed through the Social Fund, the survey indicates some
recent departures from this practice.  Firms with large housing programmes have tended to shift to
financing  directly from profits or by borrowing. This is likely to reflect in part some of the risk sharing
that firms are creating for new construction  projects.
Figure 24 is instructive  for showing  a significant  decline in the real value of housing outgoings  for
fms.  Construction  by firms across most firm size classes fell by around 60% when  comparing 1991.1-3
with the same period of 1992.  We also observe a fall in maintenance  charges which, considering  the
limited scale of the intervening  privatisation of housing  - barely 2% of tenants had privatized their
apartments by November 1992 - largely relates to the same housing stock.  Over the same reference
period, the decline is less than 30% and is not uniformly  distributed  over size classes.  Putting the two
expenditure  items together, the result is a halving  of housing  sector outlays  by firms comparing  the first
three quarters of 1991 with 1992.  The fall is considerably  steeper among the firm size classes with
higher frequencies for housing programmes.  Relating housing outlays to total benefits expenditures
captured by the firms' Social  Fund, we again  see a reasonably  significant  reduction  in the share.  For all
firms housing expenditures declined from around 45% in 1991.1  to under 20% in 1992.3.  A similar
decline in the share of gross profits - from 9% to 5% - can also be observed.
The motivation behind  the fall in housing  expenditure  is not difficult  to fathom; indeed one might
erhaps have expected  a sharper decline.  Rents remain regulated  and yield derisory current incomes.
Moreover, while housing programmes  were commonly built up in the Soviet period to reduce labour
mobility, this is cerzainly  not an objective  they  attain at the present. We can see, in fact, that nearly 40%
of current tenants in the housing stock of the survey were not current firm employees. This share was
moreover rather stable across all firm size classes with significant  housing stock.-38-
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Table  11:  Housing  Programmes  by Firm  Size
--------- FLrm  Size  Class  --------  .- ._-.-_-_
1  2  3  4  5
Type of Programme:
Permanent  2  5  8  5  1
Temporary  1  3  4  3  0
Housing  Loans  0  6  4  4  0
No Programme  7  3  1  1  2
%  of workforce
;housed  0  13.3  26.7  75.4  2.0
%  of non-firm
tenants  0  37.7  36.9  39.4  45.4
% of tenants  that
have  privatised  0  3.3  1.3  1.1  6.1
Source:  World  Bank SurveyBehaviour  of Firms  - 40
It is interesting  to estimate  the likely  effect of reducing  rent controls. Recent figures suggest  large
negative shocks to current income given the extremely  low base from which adjustments  will be made.
Fortunately, the survey allows a rough estimate  of the likely impact  of rent adjustments  in terms of wage
income.  As a base, we assume that the objective of the firm .s simply to close the fmiancing  gap
generated by maintenance  expenditures. Bearing in mind that such outlays were 50% lower in 1992.3
than in 1991.3, we can calculate  that it would  require an additional  renm payment  by each current tenant
of around 320 roubles per month in order to cover maintenance  costs for 1992.3. The figure doubles if
we assume that 1991.3 expenditures  were a more appropriate  target.  This implies that between 15-30%
of average wages (excluding benefits) would need to be directed at housing rents simply to cover
msaintenance.
We also get some idea of the likely direction  of change  for housing variables. In this regard, we
can highlight two factors. First, housing  benefits  were unambiguously  the last benefit that workers were
prepared  to lose, but inversely  a benefit that some firms were ready  to shed first. The picture on the firm
side is ambiguous  because housing construction  progranmnes  potentially offer high rates of return and
current revenue streams  - either by direct sales of new housing stock or increased commercial
lettings' 3. This ambiguity  further shows up in the responses  to questions  about future plans for housing.
Nearly 50% of responses indicated  that housing  programmes  would  be sustained  at comparable  levels to
the current.  Only 3 firms had already suspended  their housing  programme with a further 2 reporting it
as an intention. A further 30% (7 firms) intended to scale back.  Finally, in just over 50% of cases
housing stock had already been or was in the process of being transferred to local authorities.  The
decision appears unrelated to current firm profitability  but is clearly associated at the level of the firm
with the decision over new programmes.  Those firms with continuing or new housing progranmmes
tended to retain previous housing stock, possibly  cross-subsidising  it through new starts.
In short, the survey results indicate  a scaling  back of housing  construction  and maintenance. There
is a clear and sharp fall in the share of housing in total Social Fund outlays.  But the picture is by no
means uniform. Housing starts remain reasonably  high as sales and more commercial  lettings offer the
prospect of reasonable current income streams. There is also some evidence  that firms are using new
programmes to subsidize the substantial  outgoings on existing programmes arising primarily via rent
controls.  Such programmes tend to be primarily financed outside  the Social Fund, commonly  through
borrowing.
13See  the case  of TsAGI  (Box  2) reported  in Commander,  Liberman  and Yemtsov  (1993a).Behaviour  of Firms  - 41  -
7: Condusion
Drawing on a small survey-generated  database but checking those findings against information
available from more aggregated  series, we have attempted  to chart the behaviour  of some Russian  firms
over  1991 and  1992.  The findings are revealing.  Large negative shocks to output for a significant
number of firms and branches can be observed in 1992.  These shocks came from both demand and
supply sides and were fairly common. Aggregate  rather than sectoral shocks  appear to have dominated.
This was not generally associated  with a collapse  in gross profits. Indeed, the most striking result is that
industrial  and trade sector firms' profits stayed  remarkably  buoyant  in real terms. There is clear evidence
that firms with market power have exercized that muscle by rapid adjustment  of producer prices. The
inverse association  of the changes to output and profits for firms with market power suggests  that such
firms have tried to maintain or increase their mark-up.  Certainly, we find no evidence of a strategic
change in the underlying  pricing rule.
Reasonably  robust financial  perfonmance  did not characterize  the budget-financed  entities in our
sample. Their implicit  call on public financing  was probably  significant  through 1992. But for the bulk
of firms in the sample, the main impression  is of relative stability  in earnings  and in the distribution of
revenues  over the various assigned  funds  and expenditure  titles. We do not find any substantial  evidence
of decapitalization,  at least through  greatly enhanced  borrowing  or predatory  wage settlements. Likewise,
the shift upwards in interfirm arrears is less large than we might have expected from the aggregate
numbers.
Despite  the downward  pressure on output  and the absence  of major growth in any of the surveyed
firms,  employment adjustments were limited. That is not to  say that employment transitions were
infrequent, but that net separations  were relatively  restricted  given  what we know  about  the size of shocks
to output and the continuing  presence of labour  hoarding. Revealing  is the fact that firms continued to
hire at significant  rates over 1992. This can most likely  be explained  in terms of fixed factors. It is also
obviously related to the continuing high rates of local turnover in Russian firms. In short, firms have
discarded little labour and mostly ancillary and female  staff.
There is evidence that some firms have chosen to place workers on minimum wages, reducing
labour costs quite significantly  but with the result  that fall-back  income  is provided  within the firm rather
than through the labour offices.  Increased per capita contributions for the Employment  Fund would
obviously  be one mechanism  for breaking  this practice. But the larger question  relates to the efficiency
of fall-back payments through the firm, the implications  for job search behaviour and any significanceBehaviour  of Firms  - 42
difference in the likely discount rate to be applied to the hunan  capital - and hence ultimately to the
efficiency of job search - from paying de facto unemployment  benefits inside rather than outside the
firm.  In the absence of adequate  mobility, for example, and other labour market rigidities, the inside-
firm option may have merits that in other settings  would not be obvious. In summary, the core of the
Russian industrial firm - the so-called  production  worker - remains untouched. The clear implication
is that a large 'employment  overhang' existed  at the end of 1992.  The next phase of transition will be
suitably difficult.
The wage path revealed  in the survey responses  matches  well with the aggregate  information. Cut
sharply back by the large price shock of January 1992, real statistical wages then consistently  climbed
through the remainder  of 1992  back  toward early 1991 levels. Relative  wages began  to move somewhat
but to a smaller extent than might have been  expected. 7 te inertia in the system should not be ignored.
Benefits  provided  by firms are shown to account for large shares of labour income  and firm costs;
to the order of 40/45  % in the latter instance. There are signs that firms have tried to squeeze benefits -
- particularly in housing  - but that Social Fund allocations  have generally  stayed constant in the levels
and shares.  Housing programmes  are already being divested  and annual maintenance  outlays  curtailed.
Yet simply to cover annual maitenance charges  would require raising current rents to levels equivalent
to between 15/30% of 1992.3 wages.
The overall conclusion  that we derive from this small  survey exercise  is that matters on the ground
are both more diverse and perhaps rather more original  than conventional  economic  intution  night have
led us to believe. Firms did suffer for the most part negative  shocks  to production  in 1992 but this was
not generally  translated into comparable  declines  in profitability. Of course, the survey is localized  and
does not really cover  the large uni-firm  towns  or military-industrial  complexes  that are elsewhere  reported
to be in widespread  financial  distress. Further, the 1991  comparators  suggest  that average sales and gross
profits in our sample  were high and this likely results in a more positve picture of firm financial results.
But the results drive home the sad observation  that what is true in some sense for the firm may clearly
be deleterious  for the economy  at large.  Rapid adjustments  to product prices and a stable pricing rule,
combined with a strong acceleration  in nominal wage claims and an accomodating  monetary  policy, are
key ingredients for high and sustained  inflation.Behaviour  of Firms  - 43  -
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BY BRANCUI
Metall.  Chemic. Machin.  Bld.Matr.  Light  Food  Agro  Constr. Trade  Science TOTAL
BY SIZE
EMPLOY
Vry Small  0  0  3  1  1  1  1  2  1  0  10
Small  1  2  2  0  2  0  0  1  2  1  11
Hedium  1  0  2  2  2  0  I  1  0  1  10
Big  2  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  2  7
Very Big  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  3
. ...........  .....  . . ...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . .\..  . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TOTAL  4  2  8  4  7  2  2  5  3  4  41
BY BRANCII
Metall.  Chemic. Machin.  Bld.Natr. LIghL  Food  Agro  Constr. Trade  Science TOTAL
BY SIZE
FIX.ASSTS
Small  0  1  2  2  2  1  1  3  3  1  16
Medium  1  1  4  0  2  1  0  1  0  3  13
Big  3  0  1  1  3  0  1  1  0  0  10
Unclaas  I  1  2
TOTAL  4  2  8  4  7  2  2  5  3  4  41.
Source:  World  Bank  Stirvey- 45  -
Appendix  Table  2
Legal  form  of enterprises(property)
Federal Rep.  (obl)Municip.  Col.Rent.Cooper.  JntSeock  TOTAL
BY EMPL.
SIZE *
Vry Small  1  4  3  2  0  0  10
Small  3  5  0  1  1  1  11
Medium  4  3  1  0  1  1  10
Big  5  0  0  0  0  2  7
Very Big  0  1  0  1  0  1  3
TOTAL  13  13  4  4  2  5  41
Legal  form  of  enterprises(property)
Federal  Rep.(obl)Municip.  Col.Rent.Cooper.  JntStock  TOTAL
BY BRANCH
Metall.  3  1  0  0  0  0  4
Chemic.  2  0  0  0  0  0  2
Machin.  1  4  1  0  1  1  8
Bld.Matr.  2  0  0  1  0  1  4
Light  0  3  2  0  0  2  7
Food  0  2  0  0  0  0  2
Agro  0  0  1  0  1  0  2
Constr.  1  2  0  2  0  0  5
Trade  1  1  0  1  0  0  3
Science  3  0  0  0  0  1  4
TOTAL  13  13  4  4  2  5  41
Ttl  number
*  Staff:  78-  350  Vry Small  10
'351-700  Small:  11
'701-900  Medium:  10
'901-1500  Big:  7
>1501  Very  Big:  3
41
Source:  World  Bank Survey- 46  -
Appendix  Table  3
Share  of social  programmes  at  the  local  level
MOSCOW  MS.OBLAST OTHER  TOTAL
Enterpr.which  have
HOUSING:  None  14  3  0  17
Small  6  7  3  16
Compartoloc.  2  3  0  5
High  0  3  0  3
KINDERGARNone  14  7  1  22
Small  3  3  1  7
Compartoloc.  4  3  1  8
High  1  3  0  4
HEALTH  None  13  8  3  24
Small  8  5  0  13
Compartoloc.  1  3  0  4
High  0  0  0  0Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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